Authors in alphabetic order
Special attention will be given to the Hebrew and Aramaic words that are likely to underlie this concept, the johannine uses of the word, and the reflections on λόγος made by Philo and other ancient Greek philosophers. With this background, I will try to define the specific meaning of λόγος within Greek speech, by contrasting the term with other Greek words concerned with speaking (ῥῆμα, λέξις, ὄνομα, φωνή, ὁμιλία, διάλογος).
These results will be compared to the corresponding meanings of sermo and verbum in Latin. The inquiry into these terms will consequently help elucidate the following relationships that are parallel to the Λόγος–Εἰπών relationship in scripture: Υἱός–Πατήρ, ἀπαύγασμα–δόξα, χαρακτήρ–ὑπόστασις, εἰκών–ἀόρατος.
Extending the exploration of these relationships further, I will study the meaning of the verbs ἐκπορεύεσθαι and ἐξελθεῖν, sometimes paired with the phrase ἐκ στόματος, which are often applied either directly (Jn 15,26; 19,34) or indirectly (Ap 4,5; 22,1; Gn 2,10) to the Holy Spirit in Scripture.
These philological remarks will allow us to reflect on how the concepts of saying, being said, and proceeding out of the mouth define us as persons.
Still remaining, however, is the need to analytically express the similarity between certain of Philo's ideas and tenets of thought found in the NT. In this paper I propose that the working and ceasing to work of Jesus in John 5 is categorically and qualitatively in line with contemporary and previous Jewish thought, including Philo's Allegorical Interpretation. As such, the paper suggests a way to mediate the academic dialogue regarding the influence of Jewish and Graeco-Roman thought in the NT through a demonstration and analysis of the shared conceptual features between a Jesus follower, Hebrew thought, and Graeco-Roman influence.
Erasmus' challenge to the by-then traditional rendering In principio erat verbum was met with swift, intense, and long-lasting opposition. Critics attacked Erasmus from the pulpit, in the lecture hall, and with an irresistible torrent of spilt ink, and the popular response approached physical violence and civil disturbance. The answer to why Erasmus' translation caused so much outrage remains elusive. Over the past fifty years, scholars have agreed with Erasmus’ translation from both philological and theological perspectives and struggled to understand his critics’ response as anything other than irrational traditionalist vitriol. In explaining his choice, Erasmus says that he wanted to use sermo as early as 1516 but had been kept back by a superstitioso metu. This paper examines the sources of Erasmus' fear, the special place of the Prologue in late medieval piety, and Erasmus’ reenactment of the philological boldness of his hero, Jerome, in the face of textual tradition. By approaching Erasmus’ reception as a liturgical and devotional problem rather than a philological or theological one, we gain a deeper understanding of the socio-linguistic background of the firestorm set off by the seemingly innocuous and undeniably accurate translation of a single biblical word.
The manifestations and interpretations of this square have changed through at least five distinct phases over the past 2,000 years. Only in recent centuries has anyone tried to interpret it as a denotative sentence or define the letters “AREPO” as a word.
This shift exemplifies a more general tendency in modern Western thinking. The concepts of Logos and the Person have been fetishized, by which I mean they are simultaneously glorified and exalted even as they are stripped of context and meaning. Logos has been gradually reduced toward simply meaning “words” while “the person” has shrunk to the legal abstraction of “the individual,” occasionally deified into a “celebrity.” As a result, the connection to deeper reality has diminished.
The argument that reality can't be fully captured by words is often disparaged in the West as irrational "mysticism.” Yet no one seriously believes that any words – even great poetry -- can fully express the experience of a sunrise.
Along with skeptical epistemology, I advocate humor and wordplay as correctives. These are reminders of the crudeness of our linguistic maps, because they tend to zero in on the ambiguities and false conclusions these maps create. They poke us and remind us not to get too comfortable with the equation between reality, on the one hand, and the words and personae we use to describe it.
The question of whether proper names are derivable has been a point of theological debate in Jewish tradition. Maimonides reserved God’s proper name for God’s necessary existence while excluding any form of derivation. However, Avraham ibn Ezra maintained that insofar as God is the source of existence, it is essential to distinguish the primitive name from its derivable form, the latter referring to the existence of all beings as contingent on God. I claim that this debate captures a focal moment in the thought of Giqatila. While philosophically indebted to Maimonides, Giqatila is critical of his treatment of God’s name. Instead, Giqatila reconstructs the Hebrew language by incorporating the principle of derivation as developed by Ibn Ezra. Giqatila’s reconstruction, facilitated by medieval linguistic attempts to identify the name of God with the Hebrew vowel-letters, distinguishes the derived name of God as the deep structure of linguistic activity, and to which the designation of all beings is attributed. Considered in the context of linguistic Kabbalah, my paper examines how the adaptation of the principle of derivation marks a theological revision of linguistic thought; specifically, the existence of all beings is established linguistically through the name of God
Based on Heidegger’s phenomenology and the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, I present a critique of this conception of the subject while focusing on language and meaning. I claim that fully understanding the meaning of things, events, words and thoughts is based on a unique freedom of the understanding – the freedom to engage in a meaningful practice, only within which things have a fixed meaning. This freedom makes the human subject and mental life unlimited and unpredictable in a way that contradicts its explanation in mechanistic or computational terms. Every computational model includes a finite list of options based on a fixed vocabulary and syntax. Even if it has a certain level of self programming abilities, they themselves must be limited on pain of an infinite regress. This means that some forms of action and understanding are necessary for it in particular circumstances, and it can never transcend them. In contrast, the freedom of understanding entails that no understanding of the situation and no manner of response is necessary for the subject as language speaker. Ontologically, therefore, it is irreducible to a mechanism which is itself explicable without recourse to meaning. Human beings may be mechanistically explicable as organisms, but not as creatures constituted in part by understanding of meaning.
Concomitantly, a new wave of ‘philosophical biblical criticism’ has persuaded many that, contrary to an earlier generation of scholarship, there is evidence of critical philosophical thought within the Hebrew Bible. These emerging interests embolden the interdisciplinary reader of the Tanakh to be more descriptive about the pluriform philosophical systems of the ancient Israelites.
As a prolegomenon to such a comprehensive description, I will argue that the Book of Job displays significant philosophical thinking in the way that it parodies, reworks, and reinterprets the Torah. While scholarship into inner-biblical interpretation within the Hebrew Bible has successfully detailed the philological and literary shape of Job’s metalepsis of the Pentateuchal materials, a precise delineation of the author(s)’ philosophical hermeneutics implied by this exegesis has thus far been lacking.
By a close reading of a selection of key exegetical movements in the Book of Job’s narrative and poetry, it is hoped that this preliminary sketch will show that Joban hermeneutics merits serious attention as a key moment in the histories of biblical exegesis and Jewish philosophy. More generally, the presence of such a philosophical system in ancient Israel will form yet another corrective argument to long-entrenched narratives that see philosophy as being originally (and, thus, properly) Western.
The dominant Aristotelian taxonomy of nature, with its polar opposition of domem (mineral, lit. silent) and medabber (rational, lit. speaking) obviously endorsed the notion of logos as the ideal, immediate manifestation of thought. In Hebrew grammar, the accepted division of the three persons singular into medabber (first person, lit. speaking), nokhach (second person, lit. present) and nistar (third person, lit. hidden) suggests that Jewish linguists merrily continued that bias.
Simultaneously, writing a grammar of Hebrew was an intensely textual procedure, in which the divine verbum immortale, to paraphrase Augustine, seemed to recede behind the biblical soni mortali. Upon closer inspection, we notice a substantial difference in the way in which Jewish linguists approached their task. Those working within the Arabic (ultimately Aristotelian) paradigm, roughly equivalent to the Sephardic medaqdeqim, seem to have treated the holy tongue as a concrete, spoken, physical entity. Those continuing the Masoretic tradition, the Ashkenazic naqdanim or ‘punctators’, seem to have approached the language as an abstract, ‘speechless’ textual construct – a decidedly less logocentric attitude indeed. In my paper I would like to substantiate this fundamental difference, sketch its sources and contexts, and elaborate on its implications for Jewish conceptions of the holy writ as a medium of divine (and human) communication.
Leví de Barrios is one example of many converso writers, who since the establishment of a relatively tolerant Dutch Republic in 1581 had made their homes in the city of Amsterdam. A number of these men and their families took the opportunity to reconvert to Judaism. However, this conversion process was a traumatic affair, as conversos, accustomed to a private religious existence, were now required to adjust to the demands of normative orthodox Judaism. How did this array of religious beliefs enable the Iberian conversos to make multiple identity border crossings? What effects did it have on their thought and world vision? Was the emergence of skepticism one of the main results of this dramatic shift?
An examination of the notion of person and identity in the writings of these New Jews authors will yield important information on the impact of memory, migration and conversion for individual and collective identity. I believe that the literary expressions of their diasporic experience and trauma turned to be a crucial factor in the shaping of their self-perception as individuals and as a group, influencing indirectly or directly in the birth of Modernity.
These new initiatives in Israeli theatre reflect a major shift taking place, which sociologists and historians have discussed. This shift rejects the essentialist linguistic ideology of Hebrew as the sine qua non for Israeli theatre.
I would like to explore two case studies and analyse how these languages operate onstage, what is their reception, who is the audience, and what is their aesthetic rationale.
At the heart of my analysis will be the concept of postvernacularity, a term coined by Jeffrey Shandler in Adventures in Yiddishland: Postvernacular Language and Culture (2006). In his study Shander defined postvernacularity as a cultural practice where languages that are no longer in use as the vernacular gain in symbolic value what they have lost in their communicative functions, by generating vanished soundscapes, and performing vocal dimensions of familiarity and estrangement. Indeed, what is peculiar about postvernacularity is that rather than the language functioning as a vehicle of performance, its utterance is the performance itself. I will further explore the theatrical attributes of endangered languages and their attractiveness for audiences who understand them, as well as those who barely understand them. Consequently, I will analyse how one can mobilise such languages to evoke a lost, multilingual background.
However, as far as the particularities of the interaction event itself are considered, this opposition remains general. The role of the eyes in specific phases of interaction ritual in Greek culture and literature still remains understudied.
This paper’s aim is to explore the role of eye behavior in interaction through the connection between looking at a person and subsequently verbally addressing him or her, as found in various narrative and semi-narrative (e.g. Platonic) texts.
It is claimed that the aforementioned connection is more than merely formulaic, since looking-at is repeatedly presented as a prerequisite for speaking-to (e.g. in Pl. Smp. 213d and Xen. Cyr. 1.4.12 and Ach. Tat. 8.4.1).
Furthermore, this conventionalized connection between looking-at and speaking-to is exploited for various purposes, such as “slow-motioning” of the narrative pace e.g. in Pl. Chrm. 155c-d, for the sake of characterization, as in Pl. Euthd. 275d and Xen. Cyr. 1.2.3, or for dramatic purposes, as in Ev. Luc. 22:61.
Finally, some observations are offered regarding the cultural script followed in the descriptions of looking up to heaven before uttering a prayer in the Gospels and the somewhat surprising absence of the looking-speaking connection from the first part of Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Cleitophon, though this novelist’s focus on eye behavior is often compared to that of Plato, who exploits this connection multiple times.
References: Cairns, D. (2005). Bullish Looks and Sidelong Glances: Social Interaction and the Eyes in Ancient Greek Culture. In D. Cairns (Ed.), Body Language in the Greek and Roman Worlds (pp. 123-155). Classical Press of Wales.
While highlighting the American writer’s conceptual and empathic distance from his Ukrainian family's history before and during the Holocaust, the adoption of a purportedly inauthentic voice in the form of his Ukrainian tour guide's broken English narration allowed Foer to be written by the text, his separate white and Eastern-European Jewish identities revealed to, and reconciled by, him in the process.
Following on from Toury's (1995) reasoning that some PTs have gone to such great lengths to resemble genuine translations that some sort of pseudo source text may be reconstructed from it, McCarthy (2004) – along with deconstructionists – says that if the translation creates the original, then PT creates its pseudo-original culture, which will have as much substance for the target literature as that of genuine translations.
In the beginning, PT in Foer's novel seems to highlight the initial unease, stereotyping and mistrust characteristic of many foreign encounters. But then we find that if it were not for the interplay of differences, i.e. for the différance exposed by the use of PT, the characters would not be able to co-construct meaning, merge split-off identities, and establish truth as posterior to writing – the product not of telling but of re-telling – and as a necessary break with a violent past.
For centuries, Sha’ar ha-Shamayim was the most popular and disseminated Natural Sciences handbook among the Jewish spheres. Besides, the text also contains two sections about Theology and Astronomy to follow the structure that encyclopedias used to have at the middle ages.
This scientific work is a compilation of different books by other Medieval and Classical authors. The book was written in Hebrew, but to fulfill the whole composition, the author needed to add a lot of words borrowed from other languages including Arabic, Latin, Greek, Catalan and Spanish. This work was studied for centuries in Jewish schools, and its richness comes from its body and contents, and multi-language use.
For instance, in the seventh chapter, we find «lobster» (לגושט''א) from Catalan «llagosta». We can also read «sea turtle» (טרטוג''א מרינ''א) from Spanish or Catalan «tortuga marina». He did not use the Hebrew word «צב ים». Moreover, Gershon used the Catalan word «balena» (בליינ''א) for «whale» instead of using «לויתן».
For this series of lectures that will take place next October 2021, in addition to explain Gershon's work, I will specifically talk about this language phenomenon providing more examples.
Logos, speech and the mind inferred from speech acts are only the traces of the more fundamental, the sufficient condition for personhood: responsiveness. In responsiveness lies the capacity for social interaction. Persons are always social agents, personhood a function of sociality. There are degrees of responsiveness and persons are only ever such by fluctuating degrees.
Interpreters of ancient poetry have typically worked with a normative conception of person. In part because of the nature of their art and its competitive and ritual context of production, in part because of the anthropological character of their perspectives on human events, Athenian poets confronted themselves and their audiences with searching explorations of basic and easily overlooked questions: why and how are we taken in about the identity of persons; what is it that we must falsify in order to reproduce credible personhood; in what do person and non-person consist; more precisely, when is a person, when is it most, when least itself, when does personhood cease. Setting out from the theories of Alfred Gell on agency and the art nexus, Baron-Cohen, Tomasello and other recent work in cognitive psychology, I consider some examples from across Greek dramatic poetry to test this thesis.
The condition of a single man in all his multiplicity is to be considered a “a very arduous and difficult endeavour”. Luzzatto refers to letter CXIII by Seneca ad Lucilium, in which he purposely mentions the Stoic doctrine of the multiple or animal soul in human beings, because virtues can only be animal in nature: “virtutes esse animalia.” Quoting Theophrastus of Eresos ,the author of Charakteres, a series of characterisations of the human soul, Luzzatto puts the accent on a very popular rhetorical device of that time: the use of typical characters of seventeenth-century theatre. The representation of the affections of the human soul and of its different characters was a sign of distinction in a century of comedies and tragedies, put on the stage and even sung.
An attentive reader will note that emphasising the theatrical character of the human soul also means negating objective responsibility: everyone is an actor on the theatrum mundi’s stage and every time he performs a passion or its contrary. How then can one speak of an immutable essence of the human being? How to speak of personal moral responsability?
The lecture will address the philosophic topics of the unicity and multiplicity of the human being and its responsibility as persona, a word which originally means “mask”, the "character" of a theatrical performance.
Social Media's profanity into leading said beauty standards online has left such a major impact within a teenager's self esteem and confidence as these said 'perfect body image' being advertised, isn't something that is easily attained by everyone. This study aimed to bring light upon the Social Media’s play regarding Body Image and how it affects young adolescents, along with finding: a.) The influences of social media regarding the perspective of adolescents towards their own body image; b.) The challenges that adolescents encountered as they went through the standards of social media in terms of body image; c.) The coping mechanisms of adolescents towards the media’s influence on beauty standards. Furthermore, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the researchers utilized a qualitative type of research wherein we have gathered our data using a semi structured interview with open-ended questions using an online questionnaire that is constructed through Google Forms. After gathering the data, the researchers used Thematization to analyze our collected data information from our participants. The encountered major challenges and influences of adolescents mainly derived from them being easily persuaded to follow the current beauty standards they see online. Moreover, the results imply that social media has left such great influence on adolescents as these unattainable beauty standards they see online made their insecurity fluctuate and lower their self-confidence further. Nonetheless, the respondents managed to overcome these challenges by having coping mechanisms like social media detoxification, reflection, and interaction with family and friends. With that being said, the researchers would like to advocate towards the adolescents to terminate themselves from living up to the ideal world and appreciate what they have and what their body can do.
Deception is a success verb – something only counts as deception if the ruse is believed by the listener. In the case of robots which falsely display traits of personhood, we should be careful not to be deceived by their ruse.
Ethical behaviourism is the thesis that if an entity such as a robot appears to have emotions, feelings, opinions and suchlike, then so long as there is a reasonable degree of consistency, we should respond as if these emotions (etc) are genuine. Ethical behaviourism is not an ontological or metaphysical thesis, but an epistemic one: it is concerned with our inability to verify robots’ inner mental states, not with whether or not such mental states exist. In this paper I argue that although accepting ethical behaviourism may be a morally correct response to robots’ putative emotions, behaving as if the robot is a person may not be an apt response to the display of person-like traits. This is because the rights and privileges that are bestowed by personhood should require a high degree of evidence, rather than a ‘leap of faith’ in the absence of evidence to the contrary. I conclude that the evidence required by ethical behaviourism does not have a high enough threshold when personhood is at stake.
She herself says as much explicitly, but then shies away from this conclusion in other sections of her work, for reasons I believe are correct, but incompatible with her more formal argument. I critique her thesis on its own grounds, then introduce P.F. Strawson’s essay “Freedom and Resentment” to inject a different perspective and lexicon on moral responsibility. I explain Strawson’s project of reconciling his optimist and pessimist and analyze his claims on the morality of reactive and objective attitudes. I also point out the areas of overlap and discord between Strawson and Korsgaard. Finally, I end with a critique of Korsgaard’s absolutist views on agency and develop three cases in which I believe it is morally permissible to suspend Strawson’s reactive attitude or Korsgaard’s obligatory responsibility. The first case is when I take the objective attitude towards myself in moments of active deliberation or reflection. The second case of moral permissibility occurs when I suspend my reactive attitudes towards someone who will not or cannot engage interpersonally in a way that warrants reactive attitudes. The third case is one where causally deterministic circumstances demand the objective attitude, cases in which a key variable negates even Korsgaard’s grounds for practical responsibility.
Human communication is mentioned from time to time as one of several factors contributing to the economic development of industrial nations. However, human communication is not addressed specifically in terms of the distinction between orality and literacy, and how that difference plays into the passive role of homo economicus in economic affairs as compared to the dynamic role of the person of action.
In the following we use a strict representation of homo economicus that emphasizes the well-established characteristics of rationality and self-interest, and the objective of maximizing personal net advantage. Excluded by orthodox economics are qualifiers such as enlightened self-interest, altruism, sympathy, benevolence, or generosity that critics of homo economicus sometimes use while still clinging to the mainstream’s underlying philosophy of individualism.
With the exception of replacing maximum personal net advantage with human perfection as the objective for engaging in economic affairs, the person of action is very much a work in progress. In other words, we do not claim herein that our representation of the person of action is complete.
On the other hand, both concepts are essential in the western legal field, especially in the criminal and sanctioning one. The law looks to the future in the sense that it seeks to guide behaviors, but also looks to the past when judging them. And in doing so, it requires that the cause of damage be responsible for their actions. In case it is not, it will look for who should be responsible for them. Different thing are the different degrees of intentionality with which a harmful action can be carried out.
The law cannot do without both concepts but at the same time we understand that it is influenced by the meaning that guilt has acquired in today's society.
In an effort to form and re-form our concepts and conceptions of the world we resort to language, so that we may share our impressions of the reality that surrounds us and gradually come to a better understanding of it. Within classical Arabic philosophy the story is most ably told by al-Farabi, who presents a quasi-historical account of the origins of language and language acquisition. The standard story posits a shared perspective and a one-to-one correspondence between language and reality as the natural telos of the process. However, a much less appreciated strand of Arabic Aristotelianism addresses the issue of diverging (rather than converging) viewpoints, and does so on the basis of the same theoretical apparatus. What are the dynamics that drive different conceptions and descriptions of a shared world, and how does this contribute to diverse formations of the self?
An important hit of this process was the formula of Boethius, «individua substantia rationalis naturae», but its large development took place in Middle Ages, mainly with Thomas Aquinas. Both Boethius and Aquinas intended to unite Eastern and Western contributions, and perhaps this was a key of success of their proposals. Aquinas considers person as an individual with a peculiar dominion of its own acts thanks to rationality. Following Neoplatonic inspiration he describes rationality as a mode of being, able to perform an activity that provides a special unity to the subject by returning on itself (reditio completa in seipsum). In this paper I propose that, for Aquinas, the “returning” of personal being (reditio) is not only reached through knowledge, but also through love. This can be grasped in two dimensions of love, i.e., indwelling and ectasy. In this way, the being of a person is not only conserved, but it is increased in its intrinsic perfection.
Despite substancial differences between this definition and the Aristotelian comprehension of human being; we cannot either to neglect the essential similar features between the two. This contribution analyses some crucial concepts of the Aristotelian Anthropology, and offers a new and original reading about desire (orexis) in its diverse ways. A special study of the link between desire and rationality is exposed. A deep approach on Aristotle’s explanation of choice (prohairesis) brings the new mentioned comprehension of the human being. This broader vision allows us to establish some relation between the Aristotelian human being and the Boethian person.
One of the key concepts to be reviewed is the proper function (ergon) of human being, that is not reason, but “some activity related to reason” (εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου) (EN, I, 7, 1098 a). The highest part of the soul is where the proper function is developed and accomplished and is the intellective one. The analysis of the highest good and happiness shows the contemplative activity as the ultimate end. The excellence is contemplation, because is the way in which humans achieve self-fulfilment. The overcoming of intellectualist reductionism allows a deeper and broader comprehension of human essence, and therefore, reveals some affinity to Boethian person.
At crucial moments in several dialogues, Socrates takes on a role, a persona, and speaks as someone else. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is a way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and educate, different kinds of audiences. Some examples of Socratic Mimēsis are:
 in the Crito Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c);
 in the Theaetetus he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and
 in the Menexenus he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c).
In this presentation, I will focus on another instance:
 In the Hippias Major Socrates takes on the persona of the ‘annoying questioner’ (287d-304e).
I argue that Socrates in the Hippias Major creates a double in order to represent an inquisitive moral conscience that Hippias himself lacks. Hippias several times in the dialogue expresses the desire to go away by himself to investigate the problem that Socrates has raised, ‘What is beauty.’ But Hippias by himself would lack this inner voice that Socrates is performing. If Hippias were truly to learn from Socrates he would have to imitate Socrates’ method of doubling himself, and of doubting and asking himself questions.
Helen’s discourse on speech or logos in the middle of the encomium addresses the two main problems of On Not Being Theses 2-3: how thoughts are transmitted, and how meaning is standardized. I argue that Helen provides an alternate system for transmission and interpretation of meaning based on psychological emotional effect of logos. Edward Segal and D. Futter demonstrate that Helen presents a complex psychology of logos, where the psyche is affected by the “cosmetic” order of logos, in a way analogous to medicine’s effect on the body. This linguistic system presents the transmission of concepts by logos as “in-form-ational”, i.e. being based on order (form) and cosmetic appeal, and the interpretation of logos as a part of largely automatic psychological reactions. Furthermore, Gorgias’ analogy with Classical medicine describes the power of logos as proto-semiotic in quality. Just as medicine manipulates bodily symptoms through the humour system, logos effects certain emotional reactions through a psychological system, creating a natural semiotic system. Ironically, Gorgias’ reputation has fallen victim to his own linguistic scheme, being overshadowed with the emotions evoked by the title “sophist” rather than the content of his works.
This perception originates in the Hellenic worldview, characterized by anthropological dualism. According to it, body and soul are in a complementary relationship, not devoid of antagonism. A personality is more identified with the soul or with the mind than with the body.
In contrast to this western notion, the late-antique Jewish idea of the personality is inextricably linked with the body. Often, concepts focused on the body and its parts are used as terms indicating personality. Of particular interest are rabbinic speculations about obtaining knowledge and its storage inside the human being. In my presentation, I will demonstrate these conceptual features using narrative material from Rabbinic Literature.
From a neoplatonizing Christian reading under the influence of Dionysus, he analyzes in his dialogue the fundamental value of the human soul and the intellectual knowledge for the return of the multiple to Unity. Man as a person contains the various essential features of creation, and resolves the universal return of All in One.
Keywords: Eriugena; human person; One; Spirit; return.